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FOREWORD: ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL JUSTICE

John T. Nockleby*
A wide range of topics could fruitfully be studied in a
symposium entitled the "Economics of Civil Justice." For example,
how lawyers are obtained and compensated, how businesses pay for
civil liability, how losses that are created are distributed or redistributed, and the political dynamics of judges and judging, are all
subjects that reflect economic choices within the civil justice system.
In this Symposium, the second in a series exploring "Access to
Justice," 1 three of these themes are addressed. First, several essays
explore access to justice by examining how people obtain lawyers to
represent them in civil proceedings. A second topic focuses on a
very different problem: the recurring charge that the civil law
approach to tort law is undermining the insurance liability regimein this instance by pricing medical providers out of the liability
insurance market.2 Finally, the last article links contested judicial
decisions to the divergent values represented in the major political
parties.
In contrast to criminal law, where the state is formally required
to provide indigent defendants legal representation, 3 no such right to
counsel exists in civil law. As a result, the capacity of individuals to
* Professor of Law and Director, Civil Justice Program, Loyola Law
School. I would like to thank the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law

Review, and especially Anastasia Mazzella and Katherine Macfarlane, who
overcame many challenges in producing this symposium issue. Thanks also to
the Symposium Planning Committee, and particularly to Bill Daniels, Steve
Goldberg, Jack Daniels, and Jennifer Klein, who worked tirelessly to produce
the live symposium conducted at Loyola Law School on September 30 and
October 1, 2005.
1. See Symposium, Access to Justice: Can Business Coexist with the Civil

Justice System?, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 3 1009 (2005).
2. This issue is also explored in Volume 38 of the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review. See Nancy S. Marder, The Medical Malpractice Debate: The
Jury as Scapegoat,38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 3 1267 (2005).

3. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S.
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find lawyers to represent them in civil matters is stratified in at least
three ways.
First, some individuals and many businesses are sufficiently
wealthy to be able to afford a lawyer to represent them regardless of
the merits of their claim or defense. Those who must pay to bring
legitimate claims-or to defend against claims-may not like to pay,
but at least they have resources. A second tier of civil litigants,
comprised of many small businesses and middle class citizens, have
difficulty finding lawyers at a reasonable cost.
Third, some individuals are able to attract entrepreneurial
plaintiffs' lawyers to accept representation on a contingency basis.
This, however, is a limited group of individuals whose claims reflect
merit-and whose losses are large enough
to attract a private lawyer
5
basis.
contingency
a
on
them
to represent
In contrast, most Americans have difficulty finding lawyers to
represent them in civil matters that do not provide sufficient
incentive for a private lawyer to accept their case. For some of these
individuals, the class action device has emerged as a mechanism of
resolving sometimes complex claims of product defects or
environmental injuries.
Does this system of providing unequal, stratified access to civil
justice in fact promote justice? Do poor people, or people who do
not present cases that provide for the possibility of large damage
awards, have adequate access to civil justice? Do small businesses
have adequate access to appropriate representation?
In his article for this volume, Professor Stephen C. Yeazell
poses serious questions about contemporary access to courts.' He
contrasts the public nature of criminal law, in which government
controls the entire enterprise from policing to prosecution, with the
privatized nature of civil litigation.
But criminal law was not always the monopoly of the state.
Indeed, 150 years ago, Yeazell tells us, the responsibility for carrying
18, 26-27 (1981) (finding a categorical due process right to counsel for an
indigent person facing a deprivation of physical liberty, but not for an indigent
person facing termination of parental rights).
5. See
REWARDS:

generally HERBERT KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND
CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES

(2004) (describing contingency fee practice).
6. Stephen C. Yeazell, Socializing Law, Privatizing Law, Monopolizing
Law, Accessing Law, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 691 (2006).
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out criminal prosecutions was largely privatized. Individuals and not
state agents made and carried out key decisions, such as whether to
prosecute certain crimes. At that time, indigent parties had significant access to courts. He suggests that we might learn something
useful for civil justice from the decision to socialize criminal law and
prosecution.
To pursue civil justice, litigants need lawyers. The costs of
pretrial investigation, discovery, and expert testimony are all
privatized. As a result, in the absence of financing mechanisms,
"one could reasonably say that no effective access to civil justice
exist[s] for most of the population." 7 True, some plaintiffs are able
to induce representation from lawyers willing to accept a
contingency fee, but many do not have damage claims (for example,
in divorce proceedings), and thus have no hope of paying lawyers
from an anticipated future award. At least in those instances-such
as in family law and criminal justice-in which the state has created
a monopoly, Yeazell concludes that the state has an obligation "to
create avenues of access to justice for its weakest citizens."
In her contribution to this issue, Professor Anne Bloom studies a
procedural mechanism-the class action-as a means of aggregating
civil claims. 9 Bloom focuses on the alleged "crisis" in consumer
class actions-the claim that "class action litigation enriches lawyers
10
without providing any real benefit to society."
Professor Bloom analyzes how the Agent Orange litigation
contributed to this perceived "crisis." Prior to Agent Orange, the
class action device had proved central in civil rights cases, where
claims of structural inequalities in a given institution could be
comprehensively addressed. Would aggregating personal injury
claims achieve a similar success?
Bloom argues that class actions were used after the Agent
Orange cases to funnel mass tort cases into private claims systems.
Consequently, class actions are now viewed as a means to resolve
large numbers of claims cheaply and quickly, but at a significant cost
to individualized access to courts. Judges now see the class action
7. Id. at 703.
8. Id. at 716.
9. Anne Bloom, From Justice to GlobalPeace: A (Brie]) Genealogy of the
ClassAction Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 719 (2006).
10. Id. at 720.
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device as a means of achieving judicial economy, while defendants
seek global peace through settlements that bar claimants from
pursuing individual suits. Professor Bloom suggests that this shift
away from ensuring increased access to justice for undercompensated victims has fueled the current "crisis" in class actions.
However, in order to reclaim the historic role of class actions as a
vehicle for justice, Professor Bloom contends that access needs to be
emphasized over judicial economy.
Jonathan D. Glater, a New York Times reporter, explores the
issue of access to justice within a broader context: the challenge of
obtaining access to power levers other than courts that can enable
individuals to redress wrongs." Glater argues that media exposure is
more important than ever for those who lack the means to vindicate
their legal rights, but is simultaneously becoming more difficult to
obtain.
Glater juxtaposes the media's fixation on litigation involving
high-profile litigants and sensational cases with the plight of
individuals of moderate means attempting to enforce their legal
rights. Glater suggests that conventional media are facing economic
and competitive pressures that make it more likely that they will
continue to seek viewers or readers (and, one might add, advertisers)
by covering famous names rather than by deploying resources to
investigate stories with broad social impact. The problem is that a
discrimination case or the problems of the urban impoverished might
be depressing to readers, or worse, seen as "routine." Although a
shift in media priorities may be warranted, Glater suggests that
merely the fact that a problem is important or affects many people is
not enough by itself to capture the media's attention.
In their essay, Tal Finney and Joel Yanovich address an obstacle
to civil justice faced by anyone with a claim worth less than many
thousands of dollars: it is not generally economical to hire lawyers to
fight such a dispute in court.12 Finney and Yanovich cite studies
showing that, in 1995, most contingency fee lawyers would not
accept a case whose value was less than $60,000. As one part of the
solution, the authors suggest that states should increase the juris11. Jonathan D. Glater, A Broad View of Access, 39 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 759
(2006).
12. Tal Finney & Joel Yanovich, Expanding Social Justice Through the
"People's Court", 39 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 769 (2006).
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dictional limits of small claims courts to $20,000, provide simpler
information about filing and proving claims, encourage mediation,
and offer an appellate process.
Building on a different theme of the economics of civil justice,
two symposium authors address some of the myths and realities of
claims made about the civil justice system. In recent years, many
critics of the civil justice system have contended that liability
insurance rates are increasing dramatically, and that the high
insurance rates directly result from increased civil litigation and high
damage awards. In response, some defenders of the civil justice
system contend that liability insurance rates are tied more to the
success of insurers in the financial markets than to their claims
experiences. Which, if either, of these views is correct?
Have tort claims and tort damage awards in fact been increasing
in recent years? Have insurers suffered losses in the financial
markets, causing them to raise liability insurance rates to please
shareholders? In an insurance market in which insurers are free to
raise rates, what are the forces that keep liability insurance, rates
under control?
In this issue, Douglas A. Kysar, Thomas 0. McGarity, and
Karen Sokol examine the veracity of and links between a healthcare
crisis, a malpractice insurance crisis, and a lawsuit crisis.13 In the
authors' view, the United States is unquestionably suffering from
both a healthcare crisis and a malpractice insurance crisis.
Advocates of malpractice liability "reforms" have attempted to place
the blame for increased malpractice premiums onto the civil justice
system, and at the same time, place the blame for the alarming lack
of access to affordable, quality healthcare in the United States onto
malpractice victims and their attorneys.
Through examination of the arguments of the opponents of the
civil justice system, however, the authors find that there is no
medical malpractice lawsuit crisis: only a well coordinated public
relations creation aimed at imposing radical restrictions on common
law liability.14 The best available empirical evidence suggests that
13. Douglas A. Kysar et al., Medical MalpracticeMyths and Realities: Why
an Insurance Crisisis Not a Lawsuit Crisis, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 785 (2006).

14. Indeed, as Kysar, McGarity and Sokol note, a series of recent scholarly
studies support their argument that the rise in malpractice insurance rates is
unrelated to claims losses. Id. For example, Tom Baker's excellent book on
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the civil justice system is not inundated with baseless claims, that
insurance companies' losses in malpractice lawsuits are not driving
premium hikes, that doctors are not disappearing, and that there is no
surge in "defensive medicine" contributing to increased healthcare
costs. In this light, the authors urge legislators to count carefully the
social costs before yielding to pressures from the healthcare industry
to remove the modest remaining restraints that the civil justice
system places on that industry's power to affect the lives of those in
need of medical services.
Dawn House, a highly-regarded journalist for The Salt Lake
Tribune, takes a different approach to the claims of tort reform.' 5 In
her essay, House chronicles the story of Zina Lewis, a thirty-nine
year-old Utah advanced practice nurse who had to undergo a series
of surgeries to replace her faulty pacemaker. The surgeries damaged
Lewis' heart, and she unsuccessfully sought device failure
information from the pacemaker manufacturer, the FDA, and
Congress.
House weaves Lewis' story together with recent mass recall
campaigns by medical device makers such as Guidant and
Medtronic, as well as with recent legislative developments in curbing
lawsuits. House details how the lack of FDA oversight and an
inadequate incident reporting system have enabled device
manufacturers to withhold failure information from physicians,
patients, and the general public.
At the same time, House points out, the Republican-controlled
Congress has passed new laws that curtail the rights of patients and
consumers to litigate and hold medical device manufacturers
accountable. Using Lewis' story as case in point, House argues that
lawmakers, in their rush toward tort reform, have failed to consider
whether corporate trade secrets should also be curbed so that medical
device failure data can be released and whether regulatory agencies
are doing enough to protect the public's health in this arena. House's
essay illustrates the interplay between the tort system and
administrative regulatory structures. When administrative regulation
fails, the civil justice system provides the only realistic opportunity
this subject makes this argument with great clarity.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005).

TOM

BAKER, THE

15. Dawn House, Tort Reform-What About the Little Guy?, 39 LOY. L.A.

L. REv. 819 (2006).
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for an individual to be heard.
The final article in the Symposium focuses on the role of judges
in the contest over rules and values adopted by the civil justice
system.
In recent years, prominent politicians have leveled
broadsides against judges for making decisions they abhorred. The
recent controversy over what should happen to Terri Schiavo, whose
body though declared brain dead was maintained in a Florida
hospital for many years, provides a powerful example. 16 These
conflicts raise the perennial question: how are (and should) judges be
"accountable" to the political process?
In recent years two major developments have characterized
increasing tensions between the second and third branches of
government. First, judges have been under increasing attack for
being-as some argue-"unaccountable" to elected officials. These
attacks raise the question: to what degree should the third branch of
government be accountable for decisions to the legislative or
executive branches?
Second, in many states judicial elections have become
increasingly polarized along conventional political fault lines, with
some judicial candidates going so far as to state their views on
specific controversies, and other candidates claiming to favor
"business-friendly" courts. Are these two developments desirable?
Is it inevitable (or good) that statewide judicial elections will soon be
characterized by electioneering, sloganeering, and pandering?

16. See, e.g., Michael Specter, The Presidentand the Scientists, THE NEW

March 13, 2006, available at http://www.newyorker.con/
online/content/articles/060313ononlineonly0l. According to the Washington
YORKER MAGAZINE,

Post, Tom Delay, at the time the Republican majority leader, railed against
state and federal judges. The Post stated that DeLay

wants to examine what he called the "failure" of state and federal
courts to protect Schiavo, who died 13 days after the court-ordered

withdrawal of her feeding tube. DeLay issued a statement asserting
that "the time will come for the men responsible for this to answer for
their behavior." He later said in front of television cameras that he
wants to "look at an arrogant, out-of-control, unaccountable judiciary
that thumbed their nose at Congress and the president."

Mike Allen, DeLay Wants Panel to Review Role of Courts, THE WASHINGTON

Apr. 2, 2005, at A9, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A 19793-2005Aprl.html.
POST,
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Professor Anthony Champagne's study recognizes that criticism
of the federal judges is a long-standing tradition. 17 He contends,
however, that more recent attacks on the federal judiciary coming
from the right reflect not only divergent cultural and religious values,
but also the ideological differences in American politics between the
Republican and Democratic parties. As the Warren Court desegregated American society and established a progressive vision of
social and political rights, the composition of the two major political
parties moved toward increasingly divergent views on those social
issues (such as state-supported school prayer, abortion and gay
rights) decided by courts.
As Champagne notes, the "religious conservative agenda is
clear: criticize court decisions or remake the judiciary so as to be
able to overturn [liberal] decisions completely."' 8 The implication
Champagne draws is that the judiciary is becoming increasingly
politicized, not in the conventional sense that much constitutional
theory reflects the ideological bent of judges, but rather in the sense
of partisan politics.
The essays and articles in this Symposium take several tacks in
addressing the many conflicts over the economics of civil justice.
Many of these conflicts are intractable. And whatever solutions one
might imagine are likely to prove transient. But, in the best
traditions of academic scholarship, the authors represented in this
Symposium have given us new insights into the problems.

17. Anthony Champagne, The Politics of Criticizing Judges, 39 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 839 (2006).
18. Id. at 842.

